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Abstract We consider a two-period LEN-type agency problem. The principal needs to
implement one out of two accounting systems. One emphasizes relevance, the other
reliability. Both systems produce identical inter-temporally correlated signals. The
relevant system reports an accounting signal in the period in which it is produced. The
reliable system reports a more precise signal, but with a one period delay. Accounting
information is contractible only if it is reported within the two-period horizon of the
game. Accordingly, accounting information produced in the second period becomes
uncontractible with the reliable system in place. Non-accounting information needs to
be used for contracting to provide any second period incentives at all.Wederive optimal
compensation contracts in a full and in a limited commitment setting. With full com-
mitment, the reliable system trades-off more precise first and less precise second-period
contractible information, as compared to the relevant system. If the reduction of noise in
the accounting signals is strong and the distortion in the non-accounting measure is
weak, the reliable system is preferred. With limited commitment we identify a similar
trade-off if intertemporal correlation of the signals is negative. If it is positive, this trade-
off might reverse: The reliable system is possibly preferred if noise reduction is small
and the non-accounting measure is heavily distorted. Noisiness in performance
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measures then serves as a commitment device. It reduces otherwise overly highpowered
incentives and thus benefits the principal.
Keywords Accounting information Agency-problem  Limited commitment 
Timeliness
JEL Classification M4  D8  C7
1 Introduction
In this paper we juxtapose two well-known accounting concepts: relevance and
reliability. Both are anchored not only in the IASBConceptual Framework, but also in
US-GAAP and various other (local) sets of standards. Relevance requires that
accounting information is capable of affecting decisionsmade by its users. This relates
to timeliness, comparability, and understandability. Reliability refers to undistorted
complete information that is free from errors. Verifiability and credibility are
important issues here. Unfortunately, both concepts are not necessarily consistent. At
least for some reporting items the need to ensure reliability of information may result
in delayed publication, which in turn reduces relevance (see, e.g., Alexander and
Nobes 2013, p. 43). For such items, users as well as standard setting bodies need to
stress either one or the other: relevance or reliability.
Contemplating recent developments in accounting standard setting and practice,
an increased number of firms seems to lean towards relevance rather than
reliability.1 Multiple factors drive this trend. For once, the IASB clearly focuses on
providing decision-relevant information to investors2 and increasingly allows/
requires timely recognition. This includes fair value accounting, revaluation of
assets, and revenue recognition based on percentage of completion. Second, an
increasing number of firms actually apply IFRS, rather than national GAAP. They
do so either voluntarily or forced by national and/or EU-regulations.3 Finally, local
standard setters, e.g., in Germany, revised their set of national standards aiming at
harmonization and thus aligning them to international regulations.4
Whether a focus on relevance rather than reliability renders accounting
information more useful, however, is far from obvious. To tackle this question at
all, we need to acknowledge that accounting information is used for different
purposes, in particular valuation and contracting purposes. Since an accounting
system that is preferred for valuation is not necessarily preferred for contracting and
v.v., any analysis needs to specify the considered purpose.5
In this paper, we pursue the question of ‘‘relevance or reliability’’ taking a
contracting perspective. Using a stylized model, we contrast both concepts
1 E.g., Andre and Filip (2012) find evidence not only for reduced emphasis on reliability but for a
reduction in conservatism in general in financial statements of EU-countries.
2 See, e.g., Preface to IFRS.
3 See Pacter (2015).
4 Such as via the BilMoG in 2009.
5 See Gjesdal (1981).
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assuming that two sets of standards are available. One set emphasizes relevance and
the other emphasizes reliability. Relevance in our model translates into early
reporting of the information, in the sense of timeliness. Reliability is tantamount to
late, but less noisy reporting, in order to ensure a high level of credibility.
We consider a two-period principal-agent relationship. The agent performs an
effort in both periods and the principal aims at providing incentives via an
appropriate compensation contract. One out of two different types of accounting or
reporting systems is possibly implemented. Both systems produce identical
information at the end of each period. Signals are informative with respect to the
agent’s effort. Inter-period correlation of the signals is present. The first system
reports accounting information immediately, that is, in the period it is produced. The
second system delays reporting of each signal by one period reflecting strong
emphasis on reliability. Later reporting goes along with less noisy signals. In what
follows, we denote the former system the timely or early information system, and
the latter the late information system.
To provide an example for our presumed setting, assume that annual revenues are
used for performancemeasurement. Revenue, e.g. from sales of some good, is recorded
when it is realized. Typical indicators for realization are the transfer of significant risks
and control over the good to the buyer. In addition, the amount to be recorded needs to be
reliablymeasurable and an actual flowofbenefits to thefirmhas to beprobable.Whether
these indicators are fulfilled at some point in time, in many cases is a matter of
judgement. Eventually, whether recognition occurs sooner or later depends on how
much emphasis is put on relevance, as opposed to reliability. In terms of our story, the
timely system records revenue earlier. The amount reported, however, is noisy. The late
system, in contrast, demands a higher level of reliability w.r.t. the amount recorded that
is only generated over time. As a result, recognition occurs with some delay but future
benefits of the amount recorded can be safely assumed.
Reporting is a necessary precondition for contractability in our setting, as it
renders information verifiable by a third party. Beyond that, delay of reporting
critically affects contractability. To see that, consider a signal that is reported
sometime after the agent has left the firm in a distant future. In terms of our
above example, revenue from some long-term service or construction contract is
possibly realized only with considerable delay. Such a signal becomes
practically non-contractible as waiting for its realization is unsuitable. We
reflect this aspect in our model by assuming that information is contractible only
if it becomes observable and verifiable within the two period horizon of our
game. Thus, the direct effect of late information in the model is less contractible
information. With the late accounting information system in place, the second-
period accounting signal becomes unavailable for contracting, as it will not be
reported throughout the game. The late accounting system, in fact, is one that
provides a reduced set of performance measures for contracting, as compared to
the early information system.6 We assume, however, some non-accounting
6 We consider delayed reporting as the very reason for a reduced set of contractible information. The
results derived, however, hold for any two types of accounting systems that provide the principal with
different signals to be contracted upon, no matter what causes the unavailability of a measure in one
system.
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measure is present in this case, such that incentive setting is generally possible
in period two.
Within this structure, we contrast a full commitment and a limited commitment
setting. Full commitment implies that the principal and the agent agree upon a two-
period contract at the start of the game, which remains unchanged throughout the
game. In the limited commitment setting, we consider a setting with two short-term
contracts such that sequentially optimal contracting decisions apply.
With full commitment, we find that the late system is preferred to the early one only
if the reduction in noise from the early to the late first period signal is sufficiently strong
and if the second-period action can be controlled with sufficient precision.
However, in most real live settings, it is unlikely that contracting parties can
effectively commit to stick to an ex post inefficient contract. Studying limited
commitment instead, first of all, we find that the expected payoff to the principal
decreases no matter which accounting system is used. Given the assumed
correlation of signals over time, limited commitment causes optimal ex post but
suboptimal ex ante incentives in period two. As a result, agency costs increase as
opposed to full commitment.
With regard to preferability of either the early or the late system under limited
commitment, our results differ depending on the presumed correlation of signals
over time. If the signals are negatively correlated, our results pretty much resemble
the ones from full commitment. With positive intertemporal correlation they differ
qualitatively. It turns out that in some settings the late accounting system becomes
optimal, when the reduction in noise from the early to the late system is small, and
the early system dominates if noise reduction is large.
Whether intertemporal correlation of accounting measures is more likely to be
positive or negative depends on the situation at hand. Using the example of revenues
once again, correlation is likely to differ with the specifics of the goods considered.
For convenience goods we would expect intertemporal correlation to be positive, as
larger sales in one period trigger repeated purchases in future periods. In contrast,
specialty goods that are purchased in one period might not be purchased in the next
and v.v., implying that a negative intertemporal correlation should be expected.
More generally, accounting accruals or even accounting errors are likely to reverse
sometime in the future and thus induce a negative correlation. If, on the other hand,
underlying economic effects such as a persistent increase in demand are present, this
favors positive correlation. Ultimately, both, accruals and persistent effects, might
be simultaneously relevant and positive or negative correlation hinges on which
effect is stronger.7
To sum up our main results, with limited commitment and negative intertemporal
correlation (and also with full commitment), the results are almost what we would
expect: Early recognition is helpful and a late system is preferred only if the
increase in precision (decrease in noise) is sufficiently large. However, with positive
correlation, the opposite might be true. Intuitively, persistent noise counteracts
overly high ex post incentives that are present with positive correlation, and in this
sense serves as a commitment to lower incentives.
7 See, e.g., Christensen et al. (2005) for a more detailed discussion.
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It follows from these findings that even from a pure contracting perspective
neither relevance nor reliability can be identified as the uniquely preferred concept.
Accordingly, we cannot derive a clear-cut recommendation to standard setters from
our model. We do show, however, that both concepts are potentially beneficial.
Thus, our model suggests that diversity in systems, and flexibility of firms to choose
from different systems, helps to reduce overall agency costs. Having said this, we
find no strong argument in favor of the aforementioned trend towards relevance.
From a management control perspective, our results show that the accounting
system choice affects optimal incentive setting and contracting costs. Which system
is preferable for a particular firm depends on finer details, however. In particular, the
correlation of the performance measures is crucial. Under limited commitment and
negative correlation, the reliable (relevant) system turns out to be more (less)
beneficial the stronger the reduction in noise over time and the more precise an
available non-accounting performance measure and v.v. Conversely, with highly
positive correlation in accounting signals, the reliable (relevant) system is more
(less) preferable if reduction in noise is low and no high-quality non-accounting
measure is available for contracting in period two. Thus, from an empirical
perspective, our model predicts diverse system choices across firms reflecting
differences in finer details.
Our paper is naturally related to the large body of literature that examines the
trade-off between relevance and reliability. Many of those papers, however, do so
rather indirectly, e.g., considering fair value accounting as opposed to historical cost
accounting (e.g., Liang and Riedl 2014) or revenue recognition (see, e.g., Antle and
Demski 1989 and Dutta and Zhang 2002). Some explicitly focus on relevance
versus reliability such as Dye and Sridhar (2004), and more recently Zhang (2012).
Dye and Sridhar (2004) consider an accountant who observes some pieces of
information directly and receives a report on other pieces from a manager. Direct
observation is considered reliable information while reported information is
relevant, but less reliable. The accountant aggregates this information when setting
up financial statements and can either put more emphasis on reliable or on relevant
information. Dye and Shridhar (2004) analyze the effect the aggregation procedure
has on the manager’s incentives, the investment choices of the firm, and the firm’s
market value. They also oppose information aggregation to disaggregation.
Zhang (2012) investigates welfare effects of mandatory disclosure if information
is more or less relevant/reliable. Allowing for voluntary disclosure to complement
mandatory disclosure, he finds that reducing the latter to reliable information not
only induces more voluntary reporting but also might increase welfare. We are not
aware, however, of a paper that investigates the relevance and reliability trade-off
with reference to timeliness of reporting, as we do in this paper. Besides, limited
commitment has no role in this literature, but is crucial in our setting. Hence, our
paper also relates to the literature on limited commitment. It does so in two ways:
First, we strongly rely on findings from previous work on limited commitment.
Specifically, we rely on Fudenberg et al. (1990), Indjejikian and Nanda (1999), and
Christensen et al. (2003, 2005). Fudenberg et al. (1990) demonstrated that in the
absence of long-term commitment, the equilibrium outcome is determined by
sequentially rational contracting decisions. They also show that ex post efficient
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contracts may well be inefficient from an ex ante perspective. The inefficiency
results in a loss in welfare that can be avoided in special cases only. Indjejikian and
Nanda (1999) and Christensen et al. (2003, 2005) found that in a two-period LEN-
setting, limited commitment generally creates a welfare loss if performance
measures are inter-temporarily correlated.8 This result directly extends to our paper.
Second, our results show some similarities to previous papers on limited
commitment even though they are derived from a different setting. In particular,
Indjejikian and Nanda (1999) show that aggregation of performance signals may be
valuable under limited commitment. In contrast, in our setting, there is no
information aggregation. Rather, the differences in noisiness of first- and second-
period contractible information and the different timeliness of this information is
crucial.
Finally, while we show in this paper that the late accounting system under certain
circumstances can be used as a commitment to low incentives, Scho¨ndube-
Pirchegger and Scho¨ndube (2012) show that delegation of decision rights may serve
as a commitment to higher powered incentives.
2 The model
We consider a two-period LEN-model of repeated moral hazard. At the beginning
of the first period the principal hires an agent to perform a certain task at in each
period t ¼ 1; 2. The agent’s total contribution to firm value is given by
x ¼ a1 þ a2:
We assume that the agent’s contribution to firm value is not available for
contracting, e.g., because it becomes observable and contractible in a distant future
only.9 In fact, throughout this paper we generally restrict contractability to measures
that become observable and verifiable within the two-period horizon of our game.10
We consider two alternative accounting systems. Reporting from both systems is
depicted in Fig. 1. Both systems differ with respect to the timing of reporting and
the precision of the reported items. Once a piece of information is reported in the
financial statements, it becomes contractible. The timely accounting system A1
reports some signal y1 at t ¼ 1 and y2 at t ¼ 2. Accounting system A2, in contrast,
reports each signal with one period delay, but reported signals are less noisy. It
reports signal yL1 at t ¼ 2 and yL2 only at t ¼ 3 (which is outside the contracting
horizon). The second system can be regarded as a more conservative accounting
8 In contrast, in a risk-neutral setting Scho¨ndube (2008) shows that limited commitment with short-term
contracts may be beneficial if contracting parties learn about the agent’s productivity.
9 See, e.g., Feltham and Xie (1994), Gibbons (2005).
10 Although contracting on measures outside the contracting horizon would be possible theoretically, in
many cases it seems to be unusual to consider a contract that relies on measures that are realized after the
manager has left the firm. An important argument against using post retirement measures is that their use
is not sequentially optimal (see also the discussion in Sect. 5). That is, after the agent has left the firm it is
always optimal for the principal to change any performance based compensation into a fixed
compensation in order to perfectly insure the risk averse agent. As limited commitment is a crucial
assumption of our paper we do not consider contracting on variables beyond t = 2.
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system that requires a higher degree of reliability in order to report a certain type of
information. Note, however, that the information produced under both accounting
systems is identical. Although y1 is not reported in the financial statements under
accounting system A2, it is produced by the system and observed by the contracting
parties at t ¼ 1: The same is true for y2.
We define the accounting signals as follows:
yLt ¼ at þ et
and
yt ¼ yLt þ ht
yL1 and y
L
2 (and y1 and y2 as well) depend on the agent’s effort at in the respective
period. e1 and e2 are normally distributed noise terms with mean zero and variance
r2e . Furthermore we assume that corr e1; e2ð Þ ¼ k. h1 and h2 are normally distributed
random variables with zero means and variance r2h. h1 and h2 are uncorrelated and
they are also not correlated to et. Thus, yt in our model is a mean preserving spread
of yLt .
Without loss of generality we define r2e ¼ cr2 and r2h ¼ ð1 cÞr2 for c 2 ½0; 1.
Doing so, c determines the reduction in variance from early to late reporting. In the
extreme, c ¼ 1 results in the late signal being as noisy as the early one. For c ¼ 0, in
contrast, the late signal is completely deterministic and all variance is attributable to
early reporting.
The principal implements one of the two accounting systems at t ¼ 0: Which one
is used is either prescribed by a standard setter, who requires a more or less reliable
reporting, or it may be subject to the principal’s choice. In the latter case we assume
that once a reporting system is implemented, it cannot be changed throughout the
game.
As under the late system the accounting signal related to the manager’s second
period action is observed outside the contracting horizon, it is unavailable for
contracting. To be able to control second-period effort at all, the firm needs to
contract on an alternative non-accounting measure. We assume that such a measure
exists. This is an admittedly strong assumption, but serves our needs and allows us
to keep the model tractable. To account for alternative assumptions, in Sect. 5 we
characterize the consequences for our results if (i) a similar measure was available
in period one as well, (ii) no such measure was available in any period, and (iii)
contracting on yL2 was feasible. The alternative measure is defined by
P2 ¼ y2 þ g
Fig. 1 Accounting systems A1 and A2
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and could be interpreted as, e.g., a market price or cash flow measure.
g is a normally distributed random variable with zero mean and variance v2. It is
uncorrelated to all other random variables of the model. Importantly, P2 is
determined by the second-period (early) accounting signal but it is distorted from y2
as there is additional noise in the signal captured by g: Thus, P2 is a garbling of y2.
Let a ¼ a1; a2ð Þ represent the agent’s effort. The agent is strictly risk averse with
utility UA ¼ expðrðS CðaÞÞÞ. Here S denotes the agent’s compensation,
C að Þ ¼ a21þa22
2
is his personal cost from providing effort, and r[ 0 is the agent’s risk
aversion coefficient. We restrict attention to incentive contracts that are linear in the
performance measures. This assumption combined with exponential utility and
normality leads to the well-known LEN-specification. The agent’s preferences can
be represented by
CE S; að Þ ¼ E Sð Þ  C að Þ  r
2
VarðSÞ:
We normalize the certainty equivalent of the agent’s reservation utility to zero.
The principal is risk neutral. She chooses performance measures and optimal
contracting coefficients to maximize her expected net outcome U ¼ E x Sð Þ:
With respect to the agent’s compensation contract, we have to distinguish A1 and
A2: Under A1 the compensation contract is defined as
SA1 ¼ f þ s1y1 þ s2y2 þ z2P2:
Under A2 the compensation contract becomes
SA2 ¼ f þ syL1 þ z2P2:
Here f denotes a fixed payment and s; s1; s2 and z2 are incentive coefficients.
Since under A2 the accounting report y
L
1 is not available before t ¼ 2, we denote the
bonus coefficient on yL1 s rather than s1:
3 Full commitment solutions
In this section we characterize the full commitment setting. Both contracting parties
can commit to a long-term two-period contract that cannot be renegotiated after it
has been signed. The general optimization problem of the principal under full
commitment can be stated as follows with S 2 SA1 ; SA2 :
max
S
U ¼ E x Sð Þ
s:t: CE S; að Þ 0 ðIRÞ
a ¼ argmax
a0
CEðS; a0 Þ ðICÞ
The risk-neutral principal maximizes her net return subject to two conditions. The
individual rationality constraint (IR) is binding at the optimum and ensures that the
agent accepts the contract. Further, the agent chooses his actions in order to maximize
personal welfare. This is reflected in the incentive compatibility constraint (IC).
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We start by assuming that the accounting system A1 has been implemented.
Lemma 1 The optimal full commitment incentive contract, given that the early
system A1 is used, contains
s1 ¼
1
1þ rr2ð1þ ckÞ ¼ s

2; z

2 ¼ 0:
Equilibrium surplus is
U ¼ 1
1þ rr2ð1þ ckÞ :
Proof All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
As P2 is a garbling of y2 it will never be used in a contract when y2 is available.
Accordingly, z2 ¼ 0 in the optimal contract under A1: If y1 and y2 are negatively
correlated, that is k ¼ corr e1; e2ð Þ\0, an insurance effect is present, that reduces the
risk premium paid to the agent. With positive correlation, in contrast, the variance of
the agent’s compensation increases due to the covariance effect. Thus, increasing k
rises the risk premium to be paid and in turn reduces the optimal incentive rates s1
and s2 and the corresponding optimal surplus.
With the late accounting information system A2, optimal incentive rates are
stated in Lemma 2 below:
Lemma 2 The optimal full commitment incentive contract under the late system
A2 uses
s ¼ 1þ rr
2 1 ckð Þ þ rv2
v2r 1 rr2cð Þ þ 1þ rr2 1þ cð Þ þ r2r4c 1 ck2  ;
z2 ¼
1þ rr2cð1 kÞ
v2r 1 rr2cð Þ þ 1þ rr2 1þ cð Þ þ r2r4c 1 ck2  :
Equilibrium surplus is
U ¼ 1
2
2þ rr2 1þ c 2ckð Þ þ rv2
v2r 1 rr2cð Þ þ 1þ rr2 1þ cð Þ þ r2r4c 1 ck2  :
For the same reason as under accounting system A1 the principal’s equilibrium
surplus decreases in k:
The basic trade-off between the two accounting systems is that under A1 early
first- and second-period signals are used, while under A2 a more precise signal y
L
1 (as
compared to y1Þ is used along with a less precise, garbled version of y2. For the
special case of c ¼ 1 the trade-off vanishes and A1 is always preferred to A2. While
under A1 the principal can use the signals ðy1,y2Þ; under A2 she must use the garbled
set of performance measures ðy1, P2Þ to control effort (notice that yL1 ¼ y1 for
c ¼ 1Þ.
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For c\1, contrasting the principal’s surplus attainable in both settings, we obtain
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 If r2 1þ rr2ð Þ[ v2ð1 rr2Þ, there exists a critical value c^ 2 ð0; 1Þ
such that URU if cRc^: Otherwise, A1 strictly dominates A2 for all c 2 ½0; 1.
Proposition 1 states that under a certain condition there exists a threshold c^ such
that A1 will be preferred if c is higher than the threshold. To start off, note that the
benefit from reducing noise by using yL1 under A2 rather than y1 under A1 is strongest
for low values of c. Besides, for c low, the covariance effects are insignificant as
covariances equal cov y1; y2ð Þ ¼ r2kc under A1 and cov yL1 ;P2
  ¼ r2kc under A2: It
follows that, if A2 is optimal at all, it must be for low values of c:
Comparative statics show that c^ decreases in v (see the proof of Proposition 1).
First notice that v2 ¼ VarðgÞ measures the additional noise resulting from using P2
under A2 as compared to using y2 under A1. Higher v c.p. reduces the surplus under
A2 and, therefore, reduces c^. This aspect is reflected in the necessary and sufficient
condition for a critical value c^ to exist in Proposition 1. In fact, this condition
ensures that for c ¼ 0; where the benefits from switching from A1 to A2 are greatest,
the surplus under A2 is higher than under A1: It is fulfilled if v is sufficiently low.
In Fig. 2 we plot the surplus difference DU ¼ U  U as a function of c for a
given set of parameters. The critical value is given by c^ ¼ 0:71:
Fig. 2 Optimality of both accounting systems depending on c under full commitment. Parameters of the
example: r ¼ 1; r ¼ 2; v ¼ 5; k ¼ 0:9
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4 Limited commitment solutions
4.1 Limited commitment, short-term contracts and renegotiation-proofness
in a two-period LEN-setting
In this section we relax our previous assumption that the principal and the agent can
commit to a long-term (two-period) incentive contract. We rather assume that
parties can only agree on short-term, one-period, contracts. To sustain an
equilibrium of the game we follow Christensen et al. (2003). We assume that the
principal can commit to a ‘‘fair’’ second-period contract, while the agent can
commit to work for two periods for the principal. Note that the equilibrium outcome
of a sequence of two short-term contracts, in terms of induced actions and surplus, is
identical to the outcome under an optimal renegotiation-proof long-term contract
(see Christensen et al. (2003) again). A long-term contract is renegotiation-proof, if
the principal has no incentive to change the second-period contract parameters given
her information set at t ¼ 1, i.e., after y1 has been observed. We use this equivalence
result in our paper. Even though short-term contracts are more descriptive in many
real-world settings, working with a renegotiation-proof contract allows to contrast
full and limited commitment more easily. Thus, we proceed considering a
renegotiation-proof long-term contract in this section.
Christensen et al. (2003) show for a two-period LEN-model that a long-term
contract is renegotiation-proof if and only if second-period incentive weights are
chosen sequentially optimal. In other words, the optimization problem to be
considered under limited commitment is identical to the one from the full
commitment setting except that sequentially optimal second-period incentive rates
apply.
Importantly, there is a conflict between ex ante efficient and ex post efficient
contracting decisions. Ex ante, the principal considers motivating the first- and the
second-period effort, holding the variance of the agent’s total compensation at bay.
At the end of the first period, however, the first-period effort has already been
performed and, thus, becomes irrelevant when determining second period
contracting parameters. In addition, at the renegotiation stage y1 has been observed
and, thus, some uncertainty has been resolved. Particularly, at the end of the first
period the principal considers solely the variance of the second-period compensa-
tion given the information obtained in the first period.
Under full commitment the principal uses all signals for contracting that are
(incrementally) informative about the agent’s effort. The informativeness principle
holds true under limited commitment, too, but under the requirement that signals
and their incentive weights have to be chosen sequentially optimal.
In our model, the strength of the sequential rationality (or renegotiation-
proofness) constraint is driven by two main factors: the correlation of accounting
noise k and the fact that under A2 both contracting variables must be chosen
sequentially optimal, such that there is no possibility to control first-period effort
directly.
Business Research (2017) 10:189–213 199
123
In addition to the trade-off between systems identified under full commitment,
the effect both accounting systems have on sequentially optimal second-period
effort values determines which one is preferred.
4.2 Early versus late information under limited commitment
As stated in the previous section, second-period incentive rates are to be chosen
sequentially optimal with limited commitment. Thus, in the first step, we determine
sequentially optimal incentive rates under both accounting systems. They are
chosen to maximize the second-period part of the principal’s expected gross output,
a2; net of its costs and subject to the incentive constraint for second-period effort.
Costs cover the agent’s disutility of performing effort in period 2, a22=2, and the
posterior risk premium to be paid to the agent, VarðSjy1Þ.
As P2 is not informative about a2 in the presence of y2; under A1 z2 ¼ 0 holds, as
is the case under full commitment. The sequentially optimal value of s2 solves the
following problem:
max
s2
UA12 ¼ a2 
a22
2
 r
2
Varðs2y2jy1Þ
s:t: a2 ¼ s2:
For the late accounting information system, A2; the coefficients s and z2 must be
set sequentially optimal. The corresponding program is given by
max
s;z2
UA22 ¼ a2 
a22
2
 r
2
VarðsyL1 þ z2P2jy1Þ
s:t: a2 ¼ z2:
Given that the sequentially optimal incentive weights have been determined, the
overall solution under limited commitment will be found by substituting the
sequentially optimal incentive rates into the full commitment programs from Sect. 3
and then optimizing for the remaining first period incentive coefficient (under A1Þ:
Lemma 3 (a) Under A1 the optimal renegotiation-proof contract exhibits
sR2 ¼
1
1þ rr2ð1 c2k2Þ ; z
R
2 ¼ 0; and sR1 ¼
1þ rr2ð1 ck c2k2Þ
ð1þ rr2Þð1þ rr2ð1 c2k2ÞÞ :
The equilibrium surplus is given by UR ¼
1
2
r2r4 c4k4þ2c3k33c2k22ckþ2ð Þþ2rr2 2 1c2k2ð Þckð Þþ2
1þrr2ð Þ 1þrr2 1c2k2ð Þð Þ2 .
(b) Under A2 the optimal renegotiation-proof contract exhibits
sR ¼  k
rr2 1 ck2 þ 1þ rv2 ; z
R
2 ¼
1
rr2 1 ck2 þ 1þ rv2 :
The equilibrium surplus is given by UR ¼ 1
2
1k22kþrv2 12kð Þþrr2ð12kÞð1ck2Þ
rr2 1ck2ð Þþ1þrv2ð Þ2 .
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Under A1 second-period incentive rate s2 needs to be chosen sequentially optimal
(with z2 ¼ 0Þ. Under A2, signals yL1 and P2 are available for contracting only in period
two. Accordingly, both incentive rates must be chosen sequentially optimal, i.e.,
without regarding their incentive effect on the first-period effort. As yL1 does not
depend on a2; it is used purely to hedge some of the risk imposed on the agent by
compensating him based on P2. At the optimum s
R ¼ zR2 k holds. zR2 is positive
to motivate effort and sR[ ¼ð Þ\0 if k\ ¼ð Þ[ 0 applies. Using an incentive rate
with the opposite sign of the correlation coefficient triggers the hedge effect.
The sign of the correlation coefficient k also determines whether induced second-
period effort under both systems is too high or too low compared to its optimal full
commitment value.
Lemma 4 For c 2 0; 1ð Þ : Under both accounting systems sequentially optimal
second-period effort is too low (high) compared to the full commitment value if
k\ [ð Þ0:
Recall from the analysis of the full commitment setting that positively correlated
noise ceteris paribus leads to low optimal effort incentives, while negative
correlation results in an intertemporal insurance effect such that high effort
incentives will be set. Ex post, that is after the first-period early signal y1 has been
observed, however, only the posterior variance matters. As there are no intertem-
poral insurance opportunities anymore, the sign of the correlation coefficient
becomes irrelevant. As a consequence, the ex post optimal value of a2 is too high
whenever correlation is positive and too low whenever correlation is negative from
an ex ante perspective. Limited commitment, therefore, results in distorted
incentives and reduces expected payoffs of the principal whenever periods are
correlated. This holds true for both accounting systems.
Having compared limited commitment to full commitment we continue
juxtaposing the two accounting systems under limited commitment starting with
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 (a) For k ¼ 0 UR[UR: (b) Assume k\0: If
 1þ rr2ð Þ 1þ kð Þ2þrr2ð1þ 2kÞ
 
[ rv2 2rv2 þ ð3þ 2kÞð1þ rr2Þ½ , there exists
a critical value c^R 2 ð0; 1Þ such that URRUR if cRc^R: Otherwise, A1 strictly
dominates A2 for all c 2 ð0; 1Þ.
Consider part (a) of Proposition 2. If correlation is absent, two independent
periods are present under A1: First-period effort is controlled by y1 and second-
period effort by y2. Under A2, in contrast, no correlation implies s
R ¼ 0 as no
hedging opportunity exists. Thus, the principal is left with a single measure P2 to
control a2: First period effort cannot be motivated at all. Moreover, P2 being a
garbling of y2 is an inferior performance measure. It follows that A1 is the preferred
accounting system.
For k\0 (part b) we obtain a result closely related to that from Proposition 1: If a
certain condition is fulfilled, there exists a critical value c^R such that A1 (A2) is the
preferred system if c[ ð\Þc^R. Similar to Proposition 1, this condition ensures that
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the surplus under A2 is higher if the maximal reduction in variance is present
(c ¼ 0Þ: For this to be true, once again v needs to be sufficiently low. In addition, a
sufficiently small kð\ 0:5Þ is a necessary condition. The intuition is slightly
different from the full commitment one. Recall that under full commitment the
comparative advantage of system A2 is that the principal can use a less noisy late
first-period signal to control the first-period action. Under limited commitment, in
contrast, yL1 will be used in the ex post optimal contract as it is informative about a2
given P2. Thus, a1 cannot be directly controlled under late accounting. However,
under some conditions the ex post optimal use of yL1 does not heavily deviate from
the ex ante optimal use. A prerequisite for this to be true is that k is sufficiently
negative. To see this, notice that the agent chooses aR1 ¼ sR ¼ zR2 k: Only for
sufficiently negatively correlated noise the induced first-period effort is significantly
positive. Thus, only in this case a low variance of the first-period late accounting
signal (low c) is valuable, as it allows to induce a positive first-period effort at
comparatively low cost. Additionally, a low Var gð Þ ¼ v2 implies that the cost of
using P2 ¼ y2 þ g rather than y2 is small. If both effects are simultaneously present,
incentives with respect to a1 are not heavily distorted and P2 is a sufficiently good
performance measure. As a result A2 is preferred to A1.
If noise is positively correlated over time, we obtain a qualitatively different
result, as is demonstrated in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 If k[ 0 and sufficiently high and v sufficiently high, there exists a
critical value c^R 2 ð0; 1Þ such that URQUR if cRc^R for c 2 ð0; 1Þ.
Notice that this result, in some sense, reverses the results from Proposition 1 and
2. While our previous results showed that the late accounting system becomes more
favorable the stronger the reduction in noise over time, that is the lower c, now the
opposite holds true. As presented in Proposition 3, A2 is possibly preferred over A1
if noise persists, that is for high values of c. This becomes immediately apparent
from the numerical example depicted in Fig. 3. We use identical parameter values
as in Fig. 2 (full commitment), but obtain reversed optimality regions for the two
accounting systems. For c\c^R ¼ 0:91 the early accounting system is optimal and
for c[ 0:91 the late accounting system.
To get the intuition consider first the extreme cases of c! 0 and c! 1.11
Under A1; c! 0 has similar effects as k ¼ 0. c! 0 implies that ets are (quasi)
deterministic and thus all noise related to y1 and y2 is uncorrelated. Thus, the
principal is left with two independent periods, controlled by y1 and y2, respectively.
This renders the sequential optimality requirement obsolete in equilibrium and,
therefore, full commitment results are obtained. Under A2 the correlation effect is
negligible as well, but nonetheless s will be used to hedge some risk related to P2
even if the effect is only marginal. Importantly, the choice of s affects first-period
11 For c = 0 and c = 1 any value of s is sequentially optimal under A2. In the first case yL1 turns out to be
deterministic, in the second case yL1 ¼ y1 holds. Thus, these are special cases where yL1 can be ex ante
optimally contracted upon under A2. To avoid degenerated results, we consider c! 0 and c! 1 which
means that we consider c ¼ 0 and c ¼ 1 except for sR for which we consider the limits for c! 0 and
c! 1 such that there is an ex post optimal value for sR.
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effort. In particular, for positively correlated noise sR is negative, inducing a
negative first-period effort. Contrasting A1 and A2 now shows that A1 allows to
induce positive first-period effort while A2 does not. Moreover, with A1 y2 is
available to control second-period effort, while only its garbling P2 can be used
under A2. Both aspects work in favor of A1. Consequently, A2 is dominated by A1 for
c! 0:
Now consider the other extreme c! 1: Under full commitment it was shown that
A2 is strictly dominated by A1. This results from the fact that under A2 noise
reduction from the early to the late signal is absent and the ‘‘garbling’’ P2 must be
used rather than y2. Any comparative advantage of late accounting, therefore,
vanishes for c! 1: However, under limited commitment the very disadvantage of
A2 can turn into an advantage.
Under A1 with c! 1 the principal uses y1 and y2 for contracting where y2 must
be used sequentially optimal. Under A2 the principal uses y
L
1 ¼ y1 and P2 for
contracting, both being used sequentially optimal. As P2 is a garbling of y2, three
facts immediately follow: First, ceteris paribus the risk premium to be paid to the
agent is lower under A1, both ex ante and ex post. Second, incentives for a2 are
higher powered under A1. Third, under A2 no positive first-period effort can be
induced as sR\0. First and third aspects clearly favor system A1:
The effect of higher powered second-period effort under A1 relative to A2,
however, is not clear. For positively correlated accounting noise, too high powered
second-period incentives are set under A1 compared to the full commitment setting.
This holds true for A2, too. Importantly though, second-period equilibrium
incentives are lower under A2 than under A1 due to the higher ex post risk
Fig. 3 Optimality of both accounting systems depending on c under limited commitment. Parameters of
the example: r ¼ 1;r ¼ 2; v ¼ 5; k ¼ 0:9
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premium related to the garbled performance measure. Moving from the early to the
late accounting system thus may reduce distortions from the ex ante efficient
second-period effort. Of course, this effect only works if the incentives under A2
turn out to be not too low. If this effect outweighs the additional risk premium and
the loss from dysfunctional first-period working incentives, A2 is even preferred to
A1 given c! 1. Hence, at least under some circumstances there exists a critical
value for c such that the late accounting system becomes optimal, if c exceeds the
critical value.
A necessary condition for this result to apply is a strong positive correlation
between y1 and y2. Intuitively the higher the (positive) k the stronger the distortion
of the second-period sequentially optimal effort from the ex ante optimal value
under A1. Thus, in this case the benefits from avoiding high powered incentives are
the greatest.
Finally, the additional noise in P2, measured by v, turns out to be critical for the
reversed result to exist. A high value of v has two effects under A2: First, second-
period effort is low and so is absolute value of sR. The first effect implies that
second-period effort under A2 is much lower than under A1. This favors A2 as due to
the high correlation second-period incentives under A1 are far too strong. The effect
of high v on first-period effort under A2 is also positive because low absolute value
of sR keeps dysfunctional first-period working incentives at bay.
5 Extensions
As discussed in some detail in Sects. 1 and 2, we assume in our analysis that the late
second-period accounting measure yL2 is unavailable for contracting. At the same
time we presume that some non-accounting measure is present in period two to
allow for second-period effort control at all. Both assumptions are not only critical
for our results but also might appear somewhat ad hoc. In order to allow readers to
comprehend the consequences of these specific modeling choices we discuss effects
of what we consider straightforward alternative modeling assumptions below.
First, let us assume that only the accounting measures are available (no P2), but
that late reporting does not restrict the availability for contracting. In our two-period
setting, this would imply yL2 could be used for contracting once it is reported in
period three. To be consistent, under limited commitment an incentive rate on yL2
would be chosen sequentially optimal at t ¼ 2. With full commitment, obviously the
late system dominates the early one as more precise contracting information can be
used to control both efforts. No trade-off is present any more. With limited
commitment, however, it will be impossible to motivate any effort at all. To see
that, note that a2 has already been performed in period two. As the agent is risk
averse it is optimal for the principal to put zero weight on a performance measure yL2
at t ¼ 2 if it is not completely noiseless. With respect to the first-period effort the
same rationale applies. Recall that the incentive rate on yL1 was chosen to optimally
hedge compensation risk related to the use of P2. In the absence of such a measure it
is ex post optimal to set s ¼ 0 such that no effort is motivated at all. To sum up, late
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reporting dominates early reporting with full commitment, and early reporting
dominates late reporting with limited commitment. This result, again, holds if the
timing of reporting is irrelevant for contractability and no performance measures
besides accounting measures can be used. We found both assumptions not very
convincing and thus decided against them.
Second, we could have assumed that contracting on yL2 is impossible without
allowing for an alternative measure P2. This implies that under full commitment it is
impossible to motivate any effort in the second period under the late system which
works in favor of the early one. Under limited commitment the results resemble the
ones from above. Due to the absence of any performance measure the principal is
unable to motivate second-period effort under A2. Due to the ex post optimal choice
of the incentive rate on yL1 she would set s ¼ 0, again implying no first-period effort
motivation. A1 would dominate A2. Once more, the implausible assumption of using
accounting measures only kept us from using this setting.
Finally, if we consider availability of a non-accounting measure in period two a
reasonable assumption, it would be natural to allow for such a measure in period one
as well. We abstained from doing so only for tractability reasons. Including some P1
measure would not affect our solutions under full commitment. In fact being a
garbling of y1 and y
L
1 it would not be used in an optimal contract. With limited
commitment the additional measure would only be used under the late system. It
would help to control the first-period effort since it could be chosen optimally ex
ante. This would work in favor of the late system as opposed to the early one, but
would not change our findings qualitatively. It would also render all our results
messier than necessary, which is why we opted against it.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we contrast early versus late reporting of accounting information in a
two-period agency setting. Two accounting systems are present and both produce
identical information that is correlated over time. However, the reporting dates of
the signals produced differ due to a different emphasis on relevance and reliability,
immanent in the set of standards applied. This reflects that for some items reported
in financial statements—certainly not for every single one—a trade-off between
relevance and reliability exists. Ready examples besides traditional revenue
recognition, as stated in the introductory example, are fair value recognition for
assets or capitalization of self-created intangibles.
If relevance is emphasized, the signal is reported in the period in which it is
produced. With emphasis on reliability, reporting is delayed by one period at the
benefit of reducing the noise inherent in the signal. Reporting, however, is a
necessary condition for contractability in our setting. Moreover, we build on the fact
that the farther in the distant future a measure is reported, the less useful it becomes
for contracting. We reflect this idea in our model by restricting contractability to
measures reported throughout the two-period horizon of our game. As a result, late
reporting prevents the second-period accounting signal from being directly available
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for contracting. To allow for motivation of the second-period effort at all, we
assume that some, possibly distorted, non-accounting signal is present to be used as
a performance measure.
Within this structure we derive optimal compensation contracts in a full
commitment setting as opposed to a limited commitment setting.
With full commitment the comparative advantage of the early information
system is availability of a second-period accounting measure for contracting. The
late system relatively benefits from the less noisy first-period measure that is
available for contracting. Which system is preferred overall depends on which effect
dominates the other.
With limited commitment our results differ depending on the type of
intertemporal correlation over time. If negative correlation is present, the early
system dominates the late system if the non-accounting performance measure is too
much of a garbling of the second-period accounting measure. If the garbling is
moderate, the early system dominates the late one only if the reduction in noise over
time is below a critical value. Otherwise the late system is preferred. Thus with
negative intertemporal correlation our results qualitatively resemble the full
commitment ones.
With positive intertemporal correlation this is no longer the case. Rather, we find
that in some settings the early system is preferred if the reduction in noise from the
early to the late signal is large, while the late system dominates if noise reduction is
small.
The result stems from the fact that positive correlation creates excessively high
second-period incentives under both accounting systems. With the late system in
place, however, this effect is weaker as a distorted non-accounting measure is used
less heavily in equilibrium. If this favorable effect more than outweighs the
unfavorable risk and first-period effort effects related to the late system, it
dominates the early one.
Summing up, our results show that a trade-off is present between accounting
systems emphasizing relevance and reliability, implying that there is no strong point
for either favoring early or late, or alternatively more or less reliable or relevant,
reporting from a contracting perspective. This insight is amplified by the finding that
the identified trade-off is sensitive to the commitment assumption present and the
type of intertemporal correlation.
Focusing once more on limited commitment as the probably most relevant
setting, empirical implications from our study can be summarized as follows: We
would expect to see timely accounting (emphasis on relevance) if negative
correlation is present and the reduction in noise over time is not too strong. An
example for such a setting could be the use of revenue for performance
measurement in a specialty goods industry as described in the introductory
example. In contrast, if noise reduction is severe, an emphasis on reliability is likely,
in particular, if an appropriate non accounting measure is available for contracting
as well. With positive correlation in accounting signals the results reverse:
Emphasis on relevance is likely to be observed if noise reduction is strong and a
precise non-accounting measure is available.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 With the agent’s participation constraint binding the principal’s
problem under A1 is given by
max
s1;s2;z2
UA1 ¼ a1 þ a2  a
2
1
2
 a
2
2
2
 r
2
Var s1y1 þ s2y2 þ z2P2ð Þ
subject to
a1 ¼ s1;
a2 ¼ s2 þ z2:
The variance is given by Var s1y1 þ s2y2 þ z2P2ð Þ ¼ Var s1y1 þ ðs2 þ z2Þy2 þ z2gð Þ.
To avoid Var z2gð Þ it is always optimal to set z2 ¼ 0:
The remaining variance is given by Var s1y1 þ s2y2ð Þ ¼ r2 s21 þ s22 þ 2s1s2ck
 	
:
By inserting the agent’s action choices into UA1 the principal’s problem becomes
max
s1;s2
UA1 ¼ s1 þ s2  s
2
1
2
 s
2
2
2
 r
2
r2 s21 þ s22 þ 2s1s2ck
 	
:
The first-order conditions for the principal’s problem are:
oUA1
os1
¼ 1 s1  rr2 cks2 þ s1ð Þ ¼ 0
oUA1
os2
¼ 1 s2  rr2 cks1 þ s2ð Þ ¼ 0
Solving for ðs1; s2Þ we obtain
s1 ¼ s2 ¼
1
1þ rr2ð1þ ckÞ :
Equilibrium surplus is
U ¼ UA1 s1; s2
  ¼ 1
1þ rr2ð1þ ckÞ :
Proof of Lemma 2 Similar to the proof of Lemma 1 the principal’s objective
function under A2 is given by
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max
s;z2
UA2 ¼ a1 þ a2  a
2
1
2
 a
2
2
2
 r
2
Var syL1 þ z2P2
 
subject to
a1 ¼ s
a2 ¼ z2:
The variance is given by Var syL1 þ z2P2
  ¼ VarðsyL1 þ z2y2 þ z2gÞ ¼
r2 s2cþ z22 þ 2cksz2
 	þ z22v2.
By inserting the agent’s action choices into UA2 the principal’s problem becomes
max
s;z2
UA2 ¼ sþ z2  s
2
2
 z
2
2
2
 r
2
r2 s2cþ z22 þ 2cksz2
 	þ z22v2
 
The first-order conditions are
oUA2
os
¼ 1 s rr2 ckz2 þ csð Þ ¼ 0
oUA2
oz2
¼ 1 z2  r r2 cksþ z2½  þ z2v2
  ¼ 0:
Solving the first-order conditions for ðs; z2Þ yields:
s ¼ 1þ rr
2 1 ckð Þ þ rv2
v2r 1 rr2cð Þ þ 1þ rr2 1þ cð Þ þ r2r4c 1 ck2  ;
z2 ¼
1þ rr2cð1 kÞ
v2r 1 rr2cð Þ þ 1þ rr2 1þ cð Þ þ r2r4c 1 ck2  :
Equilibrium surplus is
U ¼ UA2ðs; z2 Þ ¼
1
2
2þ rr2 1þ c 2ckð Þ þ rv2
v2r 1 rr2cð Þ þ 1þ rr2 1þ cð Þ þ r2r4c 1 ck2  :
Proof of Proposition 1 The difference in surpluses is given by
DU ¼ U  U ¼ 1
2
r
1cð Þr2 1þrr2 1ckð Þð Þþv2ðrr2 ck2cþ1ð Þ1Þ
1þrr2ð1þckÞð Þ rr2 rr2c ck21ð Þ1cð Þ1rv2ð1þrr2cÞð Þ, where U
 and
U are defined in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, respectively. If we solve DU ¼ 0 for c
we obtain two solutions: c1 ¼ 12 1krr2 H þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
M
p 
and c2 ¼  12 1krr2 H þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
M
p 
with
H ¼ 1þ rr2 1þ kð Þ þ rv2 2 kð Þ[ 0
M ¼ rr2 k 1ð Þ  1 22rv2 2þ kð Þ rr2 k 1ð Þ  1 þ r2v4 k 2ð Þ2:
Notice that H[ 2krr2. Thus, c1 is either negative or higher than 1. It follows that if
there is a threshold c^ 2 0; 1ð Þ such that DU c^ð Þ ¼ 0 then c^ ¼ c2.
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Notice that DU c ¼ 1ð Þ[ 0: The reason is that for c ¼ 1 yL1 ¼ y1 holds such that
in equilibrium under A1 the principal contracts on y1 and y2 while under A2 she
contracts on y1 and P2, P2 being a garbling of y2: Furthermore,
DU c ¼ 0ð Þ ¼ 1
2
r v2 rr2  1ð Þ þ r2 1þ rr2ð Þ½ 
ð1þ rr2Þð 1þ rr2ð Þ  rv2Þ :
The denominator of DU c ¼ 0ð Þ is negative. Thus, if v2 rr2  1ð Þ þ r2 1þ rr2ð Þ[ 0
DU c ¼ 0ð Þ\0 and due to the intermediate value theorem then there exists a critical
value c^ such that DU c^ð Þ ¼ 0: This critical value is unique and must be equal to c2: If
DU c ¼ 0ð Þ[ 0 then if A2 would be optimal for some values of c there must be at
least two critical values for c from the set ð0; 1Þ where DU cð Þ ¼ 0 holds true.
However, as we know that there is at most one critical value from this set (c2), if
DU c ¼ 0ð Þ[ 0; DU[ 0 for all c 2 0; 1½  must hold true.
Comparative statics: The marginal effect of increasing v on DU is given by
oDU
ov
¼ rv rr
2c k 1ð Þ  1ð Þ2
r2r4c ck2  1  rr2 1þ cð Þ  1 	 rv2ð1þ rr2cÞ 2
[ 0:
Hence, if the critical value c^ ¼ c2 exists, it is decreasing in v:
Proof of Lemma 3 a) Under A1 the renegotiation-proof second-period incentive
rates are the solution to the following problem
max
s2;z2
UA12 ¼ a2 
a22
2
 r
2
Varðs2y2 þ z2P2jy1Þ
s.t. a2 ¼ s2 þ z2:
Like under full commitment as P2 is a garbling of y2; z2 ¼ 0 results. Thus, the
posterior variance reduces to Var s2y2jy1ð Þ with Var y2jy1ð Þ ¼ Var y2ð Þ  Cov y2;y1ð Þ
2
Var y1ð Þ ¼
r2  r
2ckð Þ2
r2 ¼ r2  1 k2c2
 	
[see DeGroot (1970), p. 55, formula (17)]. By
inserting a2 ¼ s2 into UA12 the principal’s problem becomes
max
s2
UA12 ¼ s2 
s22
2
 r
2
s22r
2  1 k2c2 	:
From the first-order condition
oUA12
os2
¼ 1 s2  s2rr2 1 k2c2
  ¼ 0
we obtain sR2 ¼ 11þrr2ð1c2k2ÞÞ.
To solve for the equilibrium of the overall game we optimize the principal’s
objective function UA1 (given in Lemma 1) over s1 given s2 ¼ sR2 :
max
s1
UA1 ¼ s1 þ sR2 
s21
2
 s
R
2
 2
2
 r
2
r2 s21 þ sR2
 2þ2s1 sR2
 2
ck
h i
:
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From the first-order condition oU
A1
os1
¼ 1 s1  rr2 cksR2 þ s1
  ¼ 0 we obtain sR1 ¼
1þrr2ð1ckc2k2Þ
ð1þrr2Þð1þrr2ð1c2k2ÞÞ : The equilibrium surplus is
UR ¼ UA1ðsR1 ; sR2 Þ
¼ 1
2
r2r4 c4k4 þ 2c3k3  3c2k2  2ckþ 2 þ 2rr2 2 1 c2k2  ck þ 2
1þ rr2ð Þ 1þ rr2 1 c2k2  2
:
b) Under A2 the principal’s problem to determine the renegotiation-proof second-
period incentive rates is given by
max
s;z2
UA22 ¼ a2 
a22
2
 r
2
VarðsyL1 þ z2P2jy1Þ
s.t. a2 ¼ z2:
Similar to part a), with X2 ¼ syL1 þ z2P2 the posterior variance VarðX2jy1Þ can be
calculated as
Var X2jy1ð Þ ¼ Var X2ð Þ  Cov X2; y1ð Þ
2
Var y1ð Þ ¼ r
2 s2cþ z22 þ 2sz2ck
 
þ z22v2 
r2c z2kþ sð Þð Þ2
r2
¼ r2  s2c 1 cð Þ þ z22 1 c2k2
 þ 2sz2c 1 cð Þk
 	þ z22v2:
By inserting a2 ¼ z2 into UA22 the principal’s problem becomes
max
s;z2
UA22 ¼ z2 
z22
2
 r
2
r2  s2c 1 cð Þ þ z22 1 c2k2
 þ 2sz2c 1 cð Þk
 	þ z22v2
 
:
From the first-order conditions
oUA22
os
¼ rr2cð1 cÞ sþ z2kð Þ ¼ 0
oUA22
oz2
¼ 1 z2  r r2 z2 1 c2k2
 þ 1 cð Þc skð Þ þ z2v2
 	 ¼ 0
we obtain sR ¼  k
rr2 1ck2ð Þþ1þrv2 and z
R
2 ¼ 1rr2 1ck2ð Þþ1þrv2.
The equilibrium surplus is given by
UR ¼ UA2 sR; zR2
  ¼ 1
2
1 k2  2kþ rv2 1 2kð Þ þ rr2ð1 2kÞð1 ck2Þ
rr2 1 ck2 þ 1þ rv2 2
:
Proof of Lemma 4 Under A1 the agent chooses a2 ¼ s2: Thus, under A1 the dif-
ference between induced effort in period 2 under full and limited commitment is
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given by Da2 ¼ a2  aR2 ¼ s2  sR2 where s2 and sR2 are given in Lemmas 1 and
3a), respectively. We obtain Da2 ¼ kcrr
2 1þckð Þ
1rr2 1ck2ð Þð Þð1þrr2ð1c2k2ÞÞ
\
[ 0 if k
\
[ 0.
Under A2 the agent chooses a2 ¼ z2. Thus, Da2 ¼ z2  zR2 where z2 and zR2
are given in Lemma 2 and Lemma 3b), respectively. We obtain Da2 ¼
kcrr2 rr2 ck21ð Þ1krv2ð Þ
rr2 ck21ð Þ1rv2ð Þðr2r4c ck21ð Þrr2 1þcð Þ1rv2ð1þcrr2ÞÞ
\
[ 0 if k
\
[ 0:
Proof of Proposition 2 Define DUR ¼ UR  UR; where UR and UR are given
in Lemma 3.
a): For k ¼ 0 DUR ¼ 1
2
1þrr2þ2rv2
1þrr2ð Þ 1þrr2þrv2ð Þ [ 0 results.
b): Assume k\0: We calculate12
DUR c! 0ð Þ¼ 1
2
1þ rr2ð Þ rr2 1þ2kð Þþ 1þkð Þ2
 
þ rv2 2rv2þ 1þ rr2ð Þð3þ2kÞ½ 
1þ rr2ð Þ 1þ rr2þ rv2ð Þ2
and
DUR c! 1ð Þ ¼  1
2
rvA
rr2 k2  1  1 2 1þ rr2ð Þ  1þ rr2 1 k2   rv2 2
þ 1
2
rr2 k2  1  1 k rv2 2
1þ rr2ð Þ rr2 k2  1  1 rv2 2
with
A ¼ r2r 4k2 þ 2k 3 þ r2r4 2k5  k4  4k3 þ 2k2 þ 2k 1 
þ rr2 3k4  4k3 þ 6k2 þ 4k 3 	þ v2r2r2 rr2 k2  2k3 þ 2k 1 
þ 2 k2 þ k 1 	 rv2  1
For k\0 A\0 holds such that DUR c! 1ð Þ[ 0. Only for
 1þ rr2ð Þ 1þ kð Þ2þrr2 1þ 2kð Þ
 
[ rv2 2rv2 þ 3þ 2kð Þ 1þ rr2ð Þ½ ;
DUR c! 0ð Þ\0. Then, from the intermediate value theorem it follows that there
exists a critical value c^R 2 ð0; 1Þ such that DUR c^Rð Þ ¼ 0: Notice that
oDUR
ov
¼ rv 1 2k
2  2kþ rv2 1 2kð Þ þ rr2ð1 2kÞð1 ck2Þ 
 rr2 1 ck2 þ 1þ rv2 3
[ 0
12 As mentioned in Sect. 4.2 c ¼ 0 and c ¼ 1 are knife-edge cases under A2 such that we consider c ¼ 0
and c ¼ 1 except for sR where we consider the limits for c! 0 and c! 1; respectively.
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and
o oDU
R
ov
 
oc
¼ 2r
2vk2r2 1 3k2  2kþ rv2 1 2kð Þ þ rr2ð1 2kÞð1 ck2Þ 
rr2 1 ck2 þ 1þ rv2 4
[ 0:
Thus, DUR is monotonically increasing in v and this effect is monotonically
increasing in c: Hence, if c^R exists it is unique such that UR \[ U
R if c \[ c^
R.
Furthermore, it follows that oc^
R
ov \0: It also follows that if DU
R c! 0ð Þ[ 0 no c^R
exists such that A1 strictly dominates A2 for all c 2 ð0; 1Þ.
Proof of Proposition 3 From the proof of Proposition 2 we know DUR c! 0ð Þ and
DUR c! 1ð Þ.
DUR c! 0ð Þ[ 0 for k[ 0: For k 0DUR c! 1ð Þ[ 0 holds true. Thus,
DUR c! 1ð Þ\0 requires k[ 0. DUR c! 1ð Þ can be alternatively written as
DUR c! 1ð Þ ¼ 1
2
c1 þ c2 þ c3
rr2 k2  1  1 2 1þ rr2ð Þ  1þ rr2 1 k2   rv2 2
with
c1 ¼ 1þ kð Þ2 rr2 k2  1
  1 2 rr2 k 1ð Þ  1 2[ 0
c2 ¼ rv2 rr2 k2  1
  1  c21 þ c22 þ c23ð Þ
with c21 ¼ r2r4ðk 1Þð1þ kÞð2k2 þ 2k 3Þ
c22 ¼ rr2ð2k3 þ 7k2  6 3rr2Þ
c23 ¼ 3þ 2k
c3 ¼ r2v4 k 1ð Þ 1þ kð Þ k2 þ 2k 2
 
r2r4  2rr2 2k2 þ k 2 þ 2 	:
For k ﬃﬃﬃ3p  1 c1; c2; and c3[ 0 such that DUR c! 1ð Þ[ 0: Thus,
DUR c ¼ 1ð Þ\0 requires k[ ﬃﬃﬃ3p  1  0:732: If k marginally exceeds ﬃﬃﬃ3p  1 the
first term k 1ð Þ 1þ kð Þ k2 þ 2k 2 r2r4 in c3 becomes negative while
2rr2 2k2 þ k 2 þ 2 is still positive as is c2. Thus, if r is sufficiently high and v
sufficiently high DUR c! 1ð Þ\0 results. If k increases further c3 and c2 are
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positive, independently of the value of r. If v is sufficiently high DUR c! 1ð Þ\0
holds true.
Thus, if this condition is fulfilled DUR c! 0ð Þ[ 0 and DUR c! 1ð Þ\0 hold
true such that (due to the intermediate value theorem) there exists a critical value
c^R 2 ð0; 1Þ such that DUR c^Rð Þ ¼ 0. From the proof of Proposition 2 we know oDURov
and
o oDU
R
ov
 
oc . For k[
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p  1 oDURov \0,
o oDU
R
ov
 
oc \0 hold true such that the critical
value c^R is unique.
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